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Purpose and Approach of the Study
Claim resolution structured settlement agreements (CRSSAs) are a relatively new
initiative within the workers’ compensation system in Washington, approved by the Washington
legislature in 2011 (RCW 51.04.063). Additionally, under RCW 51.04.069 the legislature
mandated a study of CRSSAs to give stakeholders an objective, third-party assessment of its
early implementation. The legislative language calling for the proposed study is clear about its
requirements: the study must evaluate the quality and effectiveness of settlements for state fund
and self-insured claims, must provide information on the impact of the CRSSAs to state fund
and to self-insured employers, and must evaluate the outcomes for workers.
The promulgation of workers’ compensation rules and regulations usually has to try to
find a balance between the interests of employers and the interests of (injured) workers.
According to Department of Labor & Industries (L&I) staff, the insertion of CRSSAs in a series
of reforms to the workers’ compensation system in 2011 was no different. In general, the
employer community would like the certainty of having claims permanently closed such as in a
“compromise and release” system; however, workers and their representatives would prefer the
option to reopen claims, so that future, unforeseen, medical expenses will be covered and
indemnity payments, if any, will continue. The compromise that got enacted into law was that
for claimants over the age of 55 (changed to age 53 on January 1, 2015 and to age 50 on
January 1, 2016) with claims that have been allowed and matured to at least 180 days, a
structured settlement could be negotiated that would end indemnity payments. However, future
medical expenses related to the claimant’s injury would continue to be covered by the workers’
compensation system (L&I or self-insured employer). Note that employers and their attorneys
who were interviewed by project staff indicated that they would like to see the elimination of
the age restriction on eligibility.
In satisfying the legislative mandate for the study, much hinges on the definitions of
quality and effectiveness and on their measurability. We have operationalized these concepts as
follows:
Quality







Results in positive outcomes for claimants
Perceived to be fair/equitable by claimants and
employers
 Horizontally (i.e., equal treatment for equal
circumstances)
 vertically (i.e., other things equal, more need or
more immediacy gets higher level of attention)
Unbiased (non-skewed) participation behavior
Positive outcomes for employers
Minimal unintended consequences
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Effectiveness






Outreach information is accurate and disseminated
widely to potential applicants
Processing is timely
Reasonable administrative cost per claim
Wide employer awareness and perception that
program reflects employer input
Benefits accrued exceed the costs of the program
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To accomplish the study, we have analyzed three sources of data. The first source of
data is an extract of claims data from the L&I Data Warehouse. These data have been used to
estimate models of structured settlement application and receipt, to tabulate measures of
processing time and cost, and to examine the impact on employers. The data contain
information on all individuals who received a settlement prior to December 31, 2015 and all
other individuals who met the age and claim maturity eligibility criteria for a settlement before
December 31, 2015.
Second, we have conducted a survey of claimants who applied for a settlement prior to
December 31, 2015. The purpose of this survey is to collect variables that provide information
about individuals’ application motivation and process, as well as self-reported outcome
variables, such as employment, consumption expenditures, and entrepreneurial activity.
The third type of information is qualitative data collected through in person interviews
and focus groups. These data help us to gauge stakeholders’ perceptions. The interviews and
focus groups included claimants with state fund insured and self-insured employers.
Furthermore, employers or their legal representatives were interviewed—again, some state fund
and some self-insured employers. The main purposes of these interviews or focus groups was to
gauge perceptions about the fairness/equity of the CRSSAs, to gain an understanding of the
outreach efforts by L&I, and to learn the extent of employer input that is going into suggesting
settlements to their injured workers.
The next section of the report describes the steps followed in the structured settlement
process from outreach to potential eligible claimants to payment of the structured settlement.
That section will be followed by a section that provides analyses of data concerning claimants.
This includes the claimants’ perceptions of the application and approval processes as well as
information about outcomes after receiving the settlement. The fourth section of the report
provides data and analyses of the impacts of structured settlements on employers. The final
section provides a summary of key findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
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Background Understanding of the CRSSAs
The purpose of this section is to briefly present our understanding of the CRSSA
processes and procedures as a background for the analyses of claimant and employer impacts in
the ensuing two sections of the paper. In the workers’ compensation arena, L&I is an insurer,
and in that role, it essentially serves two customers: employers and injured workers. It is the
insurer for most employers in the state, although a number of (mostly large) employers are selfinsured. In its role as insurer, it manages all claim services for injured workers. For self-insured
employers and workers, L&I establishes procedures based on Washington legislation and
conducts limited monitoring of the self-insured employers and their third party administrative
entities.
Essentially CRSSAs have been established by the legislature to be a win-win situation
for both employers and injured claimants. From the insurance perspective, they limit indemnity
payments and bring closure to claims (except for future medical expenses). For claimants, the
settlements apparently exceed the perceived present value of future payments, and the
settlements have value because they end the necessity of dealing with L&I or the self-insured
employer, including avoiding unwanted vocational rehabilitation services.
The major steps in the settlement process for an L&I insured claimant are outreach to
eligible claimants, application, negotiation and contract development, submission to the Board
of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA) for approval, revocation period, and payments.1 We
were told that for several months following the implementation of CRSSAs in 2011, L&I’s
outreach included letters sent out to eligible claimants from the structured settlement unit. In
addition, L&I’s website has information about CRSSAs and how to apply for them. Over time,
CRSSAs have become institutionalized, and L&I staff (claim managers, vocational service
specialists, claim consultants, pension adjudicators, and assistant attorneys general) as well as
outside vocational counselors will notify appropriate claimants of their availability. As noted in
the next section of the report, letters from L&I’s Structured Settlement Unit are by far the
largest sources of information for applicants. Interestingly, a number of individuals who
received a settlement and who responded to our survey indicated that they learned of the
CRSSAs from health care professionals.
An emphasis of the legislature when it passed CRSSAs was the requirement that the
BIIA approval process must consider whether the settlement was in the “best interest of the
individual” (RCW 51.04.063(2)(j)) for pro se workers. The legislation goes on to list a number
of factors that the BIIA needs to consider to make that determination. This requirement has led
to an application that collects a considerable amount of information on the claimants’
household, income levels and sources, and assets and debts. The applications are submitted to
the Structured Settlement Unit (SSU) of L&I, where they receive an initial review. We were

1

Workers whose employer of record for the claim is self-insured are eligible for a CRSSA and may
proceed on their own, but they generally already have an attorney on their claim who prepares the contract, secures
signatures, and submits it to the BIIA. If approved, the payments are made by the employer or its third party
administrator.
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told that, not surprisingly, many applications, upon review, had to be redone because data was
omitted or it was clear from the data supplied that questions were misinterpreted.
When completed applications have been received, L&I SSU analysts review them to
determine if negotiations should proceed. There are approximately 5 to 6 times as many
applications as settlements, and the data that are reported suggest that many times L&I is unable
to enter into negotiations. We did not collect a great deal of information about how the
screening is done, i.e., how it is decided to pursue negotiations with particular applicants;
however, L&I told us that the following list represents a majority of the reasons why the
department is unable to settle with some applicants:2







Worker is not at or near maximum medical improvement so that levels of permanent
impairment or work restrictions can be estimated (31%)
Application withdrawn or settlement rejected (by any party) (23%)
Worker’s financial situation does not support settlement as being in their best
interest (18%)
Worker able to work or returned to work prior to application (13%)
Worker didn’t meet statutory criteria (6%)
Other (9%)

The department indicated that although a particular settlement may not be an option at the time
of the initial application, the department does consider settlement with the worker later if, for
example, the worker’s medical condition stabilizes. Again, we have no data on self-insured
applications.
The Department of L&I further indicated that some screening criteria are required by
statute or regulation and additional factors may be reviewed in the determination of whether to
proceed with negotiations. These are as follows:
Criteria for unrepresented workers (RCW 51.04.063):
 Nature and extent of the injuries and disabilities of the worker
 Age and life expectancy of the injured worker
 Other benefits the injured worker is receiving or is entitled to receive and the effect a
CRSSA might have on those benefits
 Marital or domestic partnership status of the injured worker
Additional criteria required by the BIIA (WAC 263-12-052):
 Conditions accepted and segregated in the claim
 Number of dependents, if any, the worker has
Additional factors L&I may consider:
 Employability
 Other claims, whether open or closed
2

This information was provided by the department of L&I structured settlement program based on 503
applications received in 2015.
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Present and future sources of income

If L&I decides to pursue a settlement, the agency will notify the employer of record,
who is a party to the CRSSA if their industrial insurance rates are affected by the claim costs.
For state fund-insured employers, this can last up to 5 years from the date of injury. If the rates
would not be affected by the CRSSA, then the employer is not a party to the settlement. As long
as the employer, if contacted, is in agreement, or if the employer is not a party to the CRSSA,
L&I negotiates terms and develops a draft contract. We were told that the Assistant Attorney
General’s office reviews the contracts for the SSU. Again we did not observe this process or
learn a lot about it, but our interviews with staff members suggest that L&I takes seriously the
idea of having the settlement in the best interest of the worker and does not try to “low ball”
offers, but rather makes what it considers to be fair offers subject to the constraint of having the
settlement result in some savings for the State Fund. The contracts presumably include the
structure of the payments, the closing of the claim for time loss payments, the allowance of reopening of the claim for medical expenses that might result from the workplace injury or
occupational disease that spawned the claim, and the revocation period. The contract must be
signed by L&I, the claimant, and the employer, if affected.3
As per legislative mandate, the contracts must be approved by an industrial appeals
judge at the BIIA. We were told that in the first years of implementation, some contracts were
denied, often due to minor errors in the contract. We were told that these errors were generally
easily fixed, and the contracts were resubmitted for approval. We were also told that a number
of contracts were rejected because the BIIA said it was not given enough information in the
contracts of represented workers to tell whether the CRSSA was in the best interest of the
worker. This subsided after the Zimmerman appeal, which established that the lawyer for a
represented claimant determines the best interest of their client, not the BIIA.
After BIIA approval, there is a 30-day revocation period during which any of the parties
may withdraw their consent. At the end of the 30-day period, the claim is closed (if that is part
of the contract) and periodic payments begin. The payout period for the structured settlement
occurs in a periodic schedule, and in all cases must include at least two payments.


Initial payout plus a set amount of periodic payments—initial payment of up to 6
times the state’s average monthly wage; subsequent payments on a monthly or biweekly basis that are at least 25% but no more than 150% of the state’s average
monthly wage

All in all, the CRSSA process involves many steps, and of course any party can opt out
at any time. As noted in the first section, an indicator of effectiveness is the timeliness of the
process. Indicators of quality are the extent to which the injured workers feel that they
understood the process and their perception of how fair it was.

3

In certain instances, such as occupational disease claims, multiple employers may be involved.
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Perspectives of Injured Workers
We rely on three sources of information to garner the perspectives of injured workers
about their experiences in applying for and, if applicable, receiving structured settlements. The
three sources of information are (1) qualitative data collected through focus groups, (2) survey
responses, and (3) administrative data from the L&I data warehouse. The qualitative data come
from focus groups with fourteen structured settlement recipients who were injured while
working at state-fund employers and an interview with an injured worker from a self-insured
employer. A representative from L&I set up these focus groups for the first week of February
2016 at sites in Seattle, Tacoma, Tumwater, and Vancouver.4 We are reluctant to draw broad
conclusions from such a narrow and selected sample. Instead, we relay some of the more
notable experiences and observations and try to indicate how broadly shared each sentiment is
throughout.
To supplement our analyses of qualitative data, we conducted a mail survey of CRSSA
applicants.5 Specifically, we developed a survey instrument that collected information in five
general areas: knowledge about and motivation for applying for a structured settlement,
experience with receiving a structured settlement, financial stability and recent expenditures,
risk aversion and future expectations, and demographics. The survey was conducted
anonymously. It was sent through the U.S. mail by L&I to half of the approximately 1960
individuals who have applied for a structured settlement through the end of 2015. Of the 983
individuals to whom the survey was sent, usable data was received from 102 respondents, and
54 surveys were returned with bad addresses. The response rate was thus 102 / 927 = 11.1
percent, which is approximately what might be expected from a mail survey.
As with the qualitative data, we are reluctant to generalize from the survey data, because
the response was not random. Individuals with settlements were overrepresented as 56 of the
responses (54.9 percent) came from individuals who had received settlements. Approximately
350 settlements have been reached since the initiative began, so if the response had been
random with respect to the receipt of a settlement, only about 18 percent (175 / 950) of the
responses would have been from individuals who had received a settlement. Because of the
unevenness of response, the statistics presented here will often disaggregate across the two sets
of individuals, those who applied and those who received settlements.
The administrative data come from L&I’s data warehouse. We received separate data
files on basic claim information, vocational assessments, vocational rehabilitation, and
structured settlement applications and outcomes. We merged all of these data sets using a
4

At first, we were nervous about potential selectivity that might have resulted from the process that was
used to set up the interviews because it was done by an L&I SSU staff member who might have only contacted
individuals who had a good experience with the CRSSA process. Or it might have been the case that only
individuals with a good experience would have agreed to participate. However, the candidness of the responses that
we received when interviewing settlement recipients alleviated our concerns about this potential “cherry-picking.”
Nevertheless, it should be noted that focus group participants probably do not constitute a random sample and may
not be representative of all structured settlement recipients.
5
We gave respondents the option of replying to the survey online; however, we only received 7 responses
that way, so we will refer to the survey as a mail survey in this document.
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scrambled claim ID. As L&I collects very limited data on self-insured employers, our analyses
of the administrative data pertains only to workers from employers insured through the statefund.
The Initial Trauma
All of the workers’ paths to structured settlements began with injuries or occupational
diseases. For some workers, catastrophic injuries left them with issues that they will have to
navigate all of their lives. For others, repetitive stress injuries and years of physical labor had
finally taken a toll. Regardless of the circumstances, almost all workers we spoke to in the focus
groups told us that their bodies had given out. While several workers expressed the desire to
work, a majority said their bodies would not let them.
Sources of Information about CRSSAs
The mail survey asked respondents to list all of the sources of information from which
they learned about structured settlements, and their opinion about how informed they felt. The
most often mentioned sources of information were an L&I letter (approximately 45 percent of
respondents) and the L&I claims manager (approximately 30 percent). The L&I website was
mentioned by about 20 percent of the respondents. The other response categories that were
offered: Employers, family members, friends, and coworkers were all mentioned less than 10
percent of the time. We also allowed respondents to provide an open-ended response to this
item. Five respondents indicated that their vocational counselor had told them about it, and six
individuals indicated that a health care provider had been the source.
Of the survey respondents who received a settlement, about half felt that they were
“very” or “mostly” informed about the CRSSA process when they applied. Of the 47
respondents who answered the survey who applied but did not get a settlement, only about onethird felt that they were “very” or “mostly” informed about the CRSSA process when they
applied. Of course, we’re not quite sure of these responses since only 50 percent of the
individuals who received a settlement answered true to the following prompt: “The Department
of Labor and Industries will continue to pay my claim’s medical bill even if I have a
settlement.” The other 50 percent said false or uncertain, which is in error.
Motivation for Applying
After the initial trauma, all of the workers interacted with L&I, the self-insurer, or the
self-insurer’s third party administrator. Many of the people we talked to in focus groups found
this to be a frustrating process and expressed a desire to be done dealing with the system as a
reason for why they took a structured settlement. This corroborated a sentiment expressed
during our initial meetings with L&I staff that structured settlement represents a chance for an
amicable separation from L&I for workers dissatisfied with the workers’ compensation system.
Another reason for considering a structured settlement that we heard repeatedly was that
workers did not want to go through the retraining process. Several did not think they would get
hired or could earn a reasonable wage after vocational rehabilitation, while others thought that
they would physically be unable to do the new job. None expressed enthusiasm for learning a
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new skill at age 55 or more. The majority of workers we spoke to questioned the sense in
starting over on a new career path as they neared retirement.
Some workers chose to pursue structured settlements because they were uncomfortable
with the uncertainty about what benefits they would otherwise receive, which suggests that
structured settlements served to eliminate risk for many of the recipients. We were told by
several workers that they felt that they would receive nothing if not for the structured
settlement. While we did not get the impression that the structured settlement unit is responsible
for this impression, it still worries us that some workers seem so pessimistic about their nonsettlement options. This raises an important limitation in analyzing structured settlements and
highlights a tough decision for the worker—it is impossible to know what the worker would
have received if not for the structured settlements. Our conversations in the focus groups left us
with the impression that some workers underestimate what they might have received in benefits
from L&I.
Survey responses accorded with the sentiments we heard in focus groups about injured
workers’ motivation for applying. Respondents were given eight categories for which they
could choose as many as were applicable. About one-third of the respondents indicated that the
following were their reasons, with almost no difference between those who got a settlement, and
those who didn’t: “Resolve uncertainty about what I would receive for my injury,” “Did not
want to go through training,” and “To no longer have to deal with workers’ compensation.” Not
far behind those responses were “Provide bridge until Social Security” and “Wanted to work,”
with one or both of these indicated by about 20 percent of respondents.
The Application and Negotiation Processes
Table 1 includes information about structured settlement applications from the
administrative data that we received. From 2012 through 2015, L&I received 1,225 applications
for structured settlements from a total of 925 claimants.6 L&I initiated 35 percent of the
Table 1 Means of Characteristics of Applications
Characteristic
% of applications where agreement is reached
% of applications rejected by department
% of applications that enter negotiations but do not settle
% of applications initiated by department
% with lawyer
Months from claim start to first application
Months from application to agreement
Months from application to rejection
Months from application to negotiations being terminated
Months from application to reaching board
Months from reaching board to agreement
Months from first application to agreement
Amount of structured settlement ($)

Mean
19
42
37
35
18
47.6
6.3
0.6
0.6
4.6
1.7
9.6
96,207

NOTE: The data come from L&I’s data warehouse. The data contain information on the 1,225 structured settlement applications
from eligible claims for state-fund employers from 2012 through 2015.

All of the numbers in this report come from the data we received from L&I’s data warehouse. These
numbers may differ slightly from L&I’s internal numbers.
6
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applications, while workers initiated the other 65 percent of applications. The mean number of
months from the claim start to the first application is 47.6 or nearly four years. It is worth noting
that because of the backlog of appropriate claims at CRSSA start-up in 2012, this number would
be biased upward.
About 19 percent of the applications (n = 230) resulted in structured settlement
agreements, while 42 percent were rejected by the department. For 37 percent of applications,
the worker and department entered into negotiations, but these negotiations were not successful.
About 18 percent of applicants had a lawyer throughout the structured settlement process.
Table 2 displays the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles for several variables. The median
time from claim start to the first application is 32.8 months. The mean number of months from
application to agreement is 6.3 with 50 percent of agreements taking between 4.3 and 7.3
months to complete, which is consistent with the time spans we heard during the focus groups.7
The mean time from claim start to the first application is over a year higher than the median
because several applications are from very old claims, which affects the mean but not the
median.
Table 2 25th Percentile, Median, and 75th Percentile of Characteristics of Applications
25th Percentile
Median
Months from claim start to first application
17.2
32.8
Months from application to agreement
4.3
5.8
Months from application to rejection
0.1
0.2
Months from application to negotiations being terminated
0.0
0.2
Months from application to reaching board
2.8
4.1
Months from reaching board to agreement
1.4
1.6
Months from first application to agreement
5.4
7.0
Amount of structured settlement ($)
60,000
90,000

75th Percentile
57.1
7.3
0.8
0.7
5.6
1.9
11.4
120,000

NOTE: The data come from L&I’s data warehouse. The data contain information on the 1,225 structured settlement applications
from eligible claims for state-fund employers from 2012 through 2015.

The department appears to reject applications quickly if it is not going to proceed with
them. The 75th percentile of time from application to rejection is less than one month, while the
mean time is 0.6 months. About 73 percent of the time (4.6 months on average) from
application to agreement is consumed by negotiations and preparing the applications. The
remaining 27 percent of the time (1.7 months on average) consists of the board reviewing and
approving applications.
All of these length-of-time statistics for agreement measures describe time from the
application to the agreement for the applications that were eventually settled. The second row
from the bottom of Table 1 shows that the mean number of months from first application to
agreement is 9.6. The 25th percentile time from first application to agreement is 5.4 months, the
median is 7.0 months, and the 75th percentile is 11.4 months.
7

The data suggest that processing times have gotten shorter each year. We do not show numbers
separately by year because we are concerned about censoring. Censoring could occur because longer processing
times from 2014 and 2015 will not show up in the data if they were not completed by the start of 2016. Thus, we
would only have information on settlements with shorter processing times.
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Although people in the focus groups voiced quibbles with the structured settlement
process and offered suggestions for improvements, we were struck by how pleased people
generally were with the process. Even workers who were frustrated with their overall
experience with the system spoke highly of the services received from the structured settlement
unit staff.
The modal length of time from the start of the structured settlement process to the
agreement was six months, but it was apparent that L&I had a learning curve. People who
settled earlier reported that they felt like they were learning about the process alongside L&I’s
structured settlement unit, while more recent structured settlement recipients reported that L&I
had the process streamlined. The majority of people seemed to think the process was fair.
On the other hand, survey respondents seemed less favorable toward the process. The
survey asked respondents to indicate their satisfaction with the settlement process using a Likert
scale where 1 = Very satisfied, 2 = Satisfied, 3 = Neither, 4 = Dissatisfied, and 5 = Very
dissatisfied. The mean for the individuals who received settlement was 2.86; and 19 individuals
rated their satisfaction as either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. A follow-up question asked the
respondents about particular complaints they might have had. By far, the items that received the
most responses were “Offer was too low” and “Process was too long.”
Settlements
The final rows of Tables 1 and 2 display statistics that describe the amount of the
structured settlement, conditional on a structured settlement being reached. The mean amount is
$96,207, while the median is $90,000. These numbers do not suggest that there are many
outliers. Fifty percent of structured settlements were for between $60,000 and $120,000.
Though a few workers expressed that they would have liked a larger settlement, a
majority of focus group participants seemed pleased with their outcomes. A few even shared
that they received more than they expected. All expressed relief at being done with dealing with
the system and happiness at receiving the settlement. One person reported crying tears of relief
after the structured settlement was approved. Another said the settlement gave her the sense of
validation she needed.
As alluded to above, a number of the individuals who answered the survey who received
settlements complained that the offered settlement was too low. The survey asked these
individuals to compare the size of the settlement to their expectations. About a third of the
individuals responded that the settlement was “about what I expected.” Another third
responded that it was “lower than expected,” and the last third was about equally split between
“higher than expected” and “much lower than expected.”
Analyzing the Characteristics of Claimants Who Applied for and Who Received
Settlements
During our interviews with employers (discussed in more detail later), many were eager
to discuss the age limits for structured settlement eligibility. These employers were generally
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pleased that the minimum age was lowered to 53 in 2015 and 50 in 2016, but they wanted even
younger people to be eligible for settlements. Although we are agnostic about the age minimum,
we show various age statistics over time for different samples to help better gauge the demand
for structured settlements by age. Table 3 displays the mean, 25th percentile, median, and 75th
percentile of applicants’ age at the time of the first application by year. Panel A displays these
statistics for denied applicants, Panel B shows these statistics for applicants not denied outright
by the department, and Panel C displays the statistics for people who received structured
settlements. It appears that the distribution is relatively similar for the first three years of the
CRSSA initiative. In 2015, younger people did apply for and receive structured settlements after
the age limit was lowered by two years, perhaps hinting at unmet demand from younger
claimants.
Table 3 Age Distribution of Applicants, by Year
Mean
25th percentile
Median
Panel A: Age at first application for denied claimants
2012
60.6
58
60
2013
60.7
57
60
2014
61.0
58
61
2015
59.2
55
58
Panel B: Age at first application for claimants not denied by the department
2012
60.7
58
61
2013
61.4
58
60
2014
61.4
58
61
2015
60.9
57
60
Panel C: Age at first application for claimants who receive structured settlements
2012
62.0
59
61
2013
61.0
58
61
2014
61.4
58
61
2015
59.4
56
59

75th percentile
63
63
63
62
63
64
64
63
64
63
64
62

NOTE: The data come from L&I’s data warehouse. The data contain information on the 1,231 structured settlement applications
from eligible claims for state-fund employers from 2012 through 2015. In 2015, the minimum eligible age was lowered from
55to 53.

Tables 4 and 5 consider characteristics of claimants. Column 1 of Table 4 displays
characteristics of eligible claimants who did not apply for structured settlements, column 2
displays characteristics of claimants who applied but did not receive a structured settlement, and
column 3 displays characteristics of people who eventually received a structured settlement. The
data suggest that more costly and more severe claims are more likely to be settled. Not only is
the pre-injury monthly wage higher for settled claims, average medical costs and the total paidto-date amounts are higher as well. It is important to note that all of the data represent values as
of the time the data were gathered, not necessarily at the time of the application. For example,
workers could have received PPD payments before or after applying for structured settlements.
While these descriptive statistics are informative, they may miss or overstate underlying
relationships among variables. For instance, is it really that a high number of Independent
Medical Examinations (IMEs) are associated with applying for a structured settlement, or is it
that people with severe injuries have more IMEs and are also more likely to file for structured
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settlements? Regression analysis can help sort out these possibilities by allowing us to control
for confounding factors. We estimate regression models of the following form:

yi     Claimi   i ,
Table 4 Means of Characteristics of Eligible Claimants
Eligible But
Did not apply
% Male
64
% Married
62
Pre-injury wage ($)
3,529
Medical costs ($)
17,215
Paid to date ($)
40,403
% Received PPD
47
PPD amount ($)
7,485
% with closed claims that have been reopened
8
% Assessed for vocational rehabilitation
20
% Declared Able to work
11
% Eligible for vocational rehabilitation
5
% Started vocational rehabilitation
5
% Completed plan 1 of vocational rehabilitation
3
% Received option 2 money
2
% with lawyer for the claim
12
% with 1 to 2 IMEs
40
% with 3 or more IMEs
8
% with 1 to 2 Protests
30
% with 3 or more protests
10
% with 1 to 2 appeals
11
% with 3 or more appeals
6
Observations
18,575

Applied
but did not settle
70
59
3,640
46,903
142,164
81
18,700
13
84
35
45
44
16
26
29
59
28
39
34
23
20
695

Settled claim
79
61
4,386
53,026
271,829
18
3,486
17
97
18
75
49
41
0
41
55
25
47
25
26
14
230

NOTE: The data come from L&I’s data warehouse. The data contain information on the 19,500 eligible claims for state-fund
employers from 2012 through 2015.

Table 5 25th Percentile, Median, and 75th Percentile of Characteristics of Eligible Claimants
Did not apply
Applied but did not settle
Settled claim
25th
75th
25th
75th
25th
75th
Percentile Median Percentile Percentile Median Percentile Percentile Median Percentile
Pre-injury wage ($)
2,112
3,411
4,752
2,100
3,442
4,633
2,833
4,282
5,775
Medical costs ($)
3,296
8,601
21,104 21,442 37,505 60,500 27,991 43,696 69,463
Paid-to-date amount ($)
5,104
15,992 44,101 64,154 112,439 184,409 175,416 253,035 345,720
PPD amount ($)
5,713
11,427 19,458
9,552
17,108 29,287
7,319
16,243 28,567
NOTE: The data come from L&I’s data warehouse. The data contain information on the 19,500 eligible claims for state-fund
employers from 2012 through 2015.

where i indexes the individual, y represents the application decision or outcome, Claim is a
vector of claim and claimant characteristics that includes demographic characteristics of the
claimant, the log of the claimant’s pre-injury wage, an indicator variable for whether or not the
claimant received permanent partial disability (PPD), an indicator for whether or not the claim
had been reopened, an indicator variable for whether or not the individual was assessed as being
able to work, an indicator for the claimant being eligible for a vocational rehabilitation plan, an
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indicator for having completed vocational rehabilitation option 1, an indicator for having
received money for vocational rehabilitation’s option 2, an indicator for having a lawyer, an
indicator for having 1 to 2 IMEs, an indicator for having 3 or more IMEs, an indicator for
having 1 to 2 protests, an indicator for having 3 or more protests, an indicator for having 1 to 2
appeals, and an indicator for having 3 or more appeals.
When estimating the equation with indicator variables as the dependent variables as in
Table 6, we estimate logit models and display the average partial effects of the estimates.8 A
coefficient can be interpreted as showing how that variable is related to the dependent variable
after accounting for all of the other variables in the Claim vector of characteristics.9
Table 6 displays the estimates from the equation for applying for and receiving a
settlement. In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator for applying for a structured
settlement. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator for the department having
initiated the application. In column 3, the dependent variable is associated with the worker
initiating the application. In column 4, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to
one if the worker received a structured settlement conditional on applying.
We discuss each variable in the Claim vector in turn for all four specifications. The
analysis suggests that being male is associated with a 0.9 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of applying for a structured settlement. This is not because the department is more
likely to target men. Rather, men are more likely to initiate applications on their own. Marital
status is uncorrelated with applying for a structured settlement after controlling for all of the
other factors. Neither marital status nor being male is related to receiving a structured settlement
conditional on applying for one.
People who earned a higher wage in the month before the injury are more likely to apply
as are people with higher medical costs resulting from their injury. The coefficient on the log of
the pre-injury wage is 0.007, which indicates that doubling the pre-injury wage is associated
with a 0.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of applying for a structured settlement.
We do not detect a statistically significant correlation between having a higher pre-injury wage
and receiving a structured settlement after controlling for confounding factors.

8

The logit model is a regression model that is used to examine the relationship of a set of variables to an
event with a binary outcome (e.g., applied versus did not apply). The name comes from an assumption that the
error term has a standard logistic distribution.
9
Our null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between each independent variable and the dependent
variable, but our model generally produces a non-zero estimate. The asterisks in Tables 6 and 7 indicate how
confident we are that the coefficient is not equal to zero. One asterisk means that there is a 90 to 95 percent chance
that the independent variable is related to the dependent variable after controlling for other factors. Two asterisks
indicate that there is 95 to 99 percent chance that the independent variable is related to the dependent variable after
controlling for other factors. Three asterisks mean that there is over a 99 percent chance that the independent
variable is related to the dependent variable after controlling for other factors. When we are less than 90 percent
sure that a coefficient is different from zero, we do not put any asterisks next to the estimate. For these “statistically
insignificant” variables, we say that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between the
independent variable and the dependent variable. While a coefficient could be statistically indistinguishable from
zero because the independent variable is not meaningfully related to the dependent variable, the lack of significance
could also arise if we do not have enough precision to identify the relationship.
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Table 6 Average Marginal Coefficients from Logit Model for Who Applies and Receives Structured
Settlements
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Applied for structured Department initiated Worker initiated Received structured
settlement
Application
application
settlement
Male
0.009***
−0.001
0.009***
−0.003
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.029)
Married
0.001
−0.001
0.002
0.005
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.024)
Log of pre-injury wage
0.007***
0.003*
0.004**
0.039
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.026)
Log of medical spending
0.029***
0.008***
0.022***
0.047***
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.017)
Received PPD
−0.033***
−0.001
−0.031***
−0.334***
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.018)
Claim reopened
−0.015***
−0.013***
−0.001
0.196***
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.036)
Assessed as able to work
0.024***
0.009***
0.015***
−0.063**
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.025)
Eligible for vocational
0.068***
0.009**
0.054***
0.197***
rehabilitation plan
(0.006)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.030)
Returned to work
0.005
−0.002
0.003
−0.040
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.006)
(0.050)
Completed option 1
−0.007
0.001
−0.005
−0.093***
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.033)
Received option 2 money
0.021***
0.018***
0.004
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.005)
Had lawyer
−0.000
0.006***
−0.007**
0.180***
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.029)
Had 1 to 2 IMEs
0.020***
0.012***
0.011***
−0.052*
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.027)
Had 3 or more IMEs
0.012**
0.014***
0.000
−0.090**
(0.006)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.039)
Had 1 to 2 protests
0.011***
0.006**
0.005*
0.029
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.026)
Had 3 or more protests
0.018***
0.010***
0.005
−0.066**
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.033)
Had 1 to 2 appeals
0.005
0.001
0.004
0.033
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.029)
Had 3 or more appeals
−0.001
0.003
−0.003
−0.017
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.040)
Sample
All eligible
All eligible
All eligible
All eligible
claimants
Claimants
claimants
applicants
R2
0.274
0.232
0.247
0.525
Observations
18,755
18,755
18,755
741
NOTE: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. In columns 1, 2, and 3, the sample includes all claims that were
ever eligible for a structured settlement between 2012 and 2015 and have values for all of the variables in the model. In column 4,
the sample includes the claims for which applications were filed to settle the claim that have values for all of the variables in the
model. The table displays average marginal effects from logit models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates.

A 100 percent higher medical cost is associated with being 2.9 percentage points more
likely to apply for a structured settlement and a 4.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood
of receiving a structured settlement conditional on applying. People who receive PPD are 3.3
percentage points less likely to apply for a structured settlement after controlling for the other
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factors. Most of this decrease appears to come from workers initiating the application. However,
receiving PPD is associated with a 33.4 percentage point fall in the likelihood of receiving a
structured settlement. These results suggest that PPD benefits may be regarded as an alternative
to structured settlements.
Having a claim that has been reopened is associated with a 1.5 percentage point decrease
in the likelihood of applying for a structured settlement. This decrease appears to be coming
from the department being less likely to initiate the application once it has been closed.
Conditional on applying, people with reopened claims are 19.6 percent more likely to receive a
structured settlement than those that do not.
People who are assessed as being able to work through vocational rehabilitation
assessment are 2.4 percentage points more likely to apply for a structured settlement, while
people determined to be eligible for a vocational rehabilitation plan (likely meaning retraining)
are 6.8 percentage points more likely to apply for a structured settlement. People who are
assessed as able to work are 6.3 percentage points less likely to receive a structured settlement
conditional on applying, while people who are eligible for vocational rehabilitation are 19.7
percentage points more likely to receive a structured settlement conditional on applying. We do
not find that having returned to work or completing a retraining plan (referred to as selecting
Option 1) are associated with applying for a structured settlement after accounting for other
factors. We find that choosing to receive a cash award equivalent to a defined period of time
loss payments in lieu of going through a retraining plan (referred to as selecting Option 2) is
associated with a 2.1 percentage point increase in applying for a structured settlement. This
occurs despite the fact that nobody has received both Option 2 money and a structured
settlement. As with PPD, these results suggest that some candidates for structured settlements
end up receiving Option 2 money instead. Similarly, completing Option 1 is associated with a
9.3 percentage point decrease in receiving a structured settlement for those who apply. This
result highlights that people do not go through vocational rehabilitation and then settle a claim.
The coefficient on having a lawyer is zero in the first column, positive in the second
column, and negative in the third column. These results suggest that workers with lawyers are
less likely to initiate structured settlements. Conditional on applying, though, having a lawyer
increases the likelihood of receiving a structured settlement. Applicants with lawyers are 18
percentage points more likely to receive a structured settlement, perhaps because lawyers have a
better understanding of which workers will benefit from the program and what settlements will
be approved.10
Finally, the analysis indicates that workers with more complicated or contentious cases
as measured by IMEs and protests are more likely to apply for structured settlements, with

10
We should note that we use two different attorney variables for the analysis. The claim data have
information about whether or not the worker was represented. We use that variable when examining the application
decision. For all of those who apply for a structured settlement, the structured settlement data have a separate
variable for representation, which is often but not always consistent with the attorney variable from the claim data
set. For all outcomes conditional on applying or conditional on receiving a structured settlement, we use the
attorney information from the structured settlement data.
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much of this increase coming from L&I initiating applications. However, conditional on
applying, people with more protests are less likely to receive a structured settlement.
In Table 7, we estimate models that describe the outcomes, conditional on receiving a
structured settlement. In the first column, the dependent variable is the number of months the
process took from first application until an agreement was reached. A concern with using the
total elapsed time as a dependent variable is that the results may be sensitive to outliers.
Table 7 Estimates from Linear Regression Models
(1)
(2)
(3)
Months from first
Log(Months from
application to
first application to Amount of structured
agreement
agreement)
settlement ($)
Male
−0.438
−0.002
−5,039
(1.183)
(0.097)
(7,229)
Married
0.298
0.029
14,998***
(0.919)
(0.081)
(5,561)
Log of pre-injury wage
0.548
0.071
34,525***
(0.837)
(0.080)
(6,373)
Log of medical spending
1.088
0.074
20,761***
(0.720)
(0.056)
(3,788)
Received PPD
0.060
−0.059
8,567
(1.836)
(0.141)
(10,102)
Claim reopened
−2.776*
−0.187
−7,473
(1.634)
(0.137)
(10,242)
Assessed as able to work
−2.296**
−0.212**
−8,133
(0.948)
(0.088)
(7,361)
Eligible for vocational
−1.632
−0.200**
−24,577***
rehabilitation plan
(1.300)
(0.099)
(6,721)
Returned to work
6.473
0.484*
−35,235***
(4.221)
(0.291)
(11,076)
Completed option 1
−0.426
−0.041
−9,983*
(0.996)
(0.086)
(5,766)
Had lawyer
1.373
0.116
13,946***
(1.098)
(0.092)
(5,340)
Had 1 to 2 IMEs
1.215
0.087
850
(1.110)
(0.104)
(6,053)
Had 3 or more IMEs
2.873*
0.288**
3,422
(1.595)
(0.132)
(9,002)
Had 1 to 2 protests
−0.690
−0.062
15,207**
(1.214)
(0.104)
(6,403)
Had 3 or more protests
−0.188
0.024
13,590*
(1.514)
(0.134)
(7,665)
Had 1 to 2 appeals
0.525
0.057
−4,548
(1.256)
(0.105)
(7,233)
Had 3 or more appeals
−3.855***
−0.426***
−7,940
(1.348)
(0.118)
(8,245)
R2
0.130
0.153
0.393

(4)
Log(Amount of
structured
settlement)
−0.008
(0.071)
0.154**
(0.061)
0.404***
(0.058)
0.210***
(0.039)
0.087
(0.096)
−0.041
(0.101)
−0.131*
(0.073)
−0.249***
(0.062)
−0.353*
(0.184)
−0.172***
(0.064)
0.126**
(0.062)
−0.026
(0.072)
0.002
(0.088)
0.158**
(0.071)
0.187**
(0.087)
−0.030
(0.077)
−0.071
(0.089)
0.425

NOTE: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. In columns 1, 2, and 3, the sample includes all
230 claims that received a structured settlement between 2012 and 2015. The table displays coefficients from linear
regression models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
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Therefore, in column 2 we show results that use the natural logarithm of total elapsed time as
the dependent variable. When processing time is the dependent variable, a coefficient can be
interpreted as the change in the number of months of processing time from a one-unit increase
in the independent variable. When the log of processing time is the dependent variable, a
coefficient can be interpreted as the percent change in processing time from a one-unit increase
in the independent variable.
Most of the coefficients in columns 1 and 2 are statistically insignificant, meaning we
cannot be confident that they are different from zero. This statistical insignificance may occur
because the estimates are noisy due to the small sample size or because most of these factors do
not explain the length of the process. The results suggest that reopened claims and claims for
people eligible for vocational rehabilitation may move through the system faster, but the results
are only marginally significant. There is stronger evidence that the process is shorter for
claimants with three or more appeals. People who return to work may have longer processing
times, while there is stronger evidence that workers with at least three IMEs have longer
processing times.
In column 3 of Table 7, the dependent variable is the total dollar amount of the
structured settlement, while in column 4 the dependent variable is the log of the total dollar
amount. The results suggest that married people’s average structured settlements are 15.4
percent higher than those of unmarried people. Higher earners also receive higher structured
settlement offers. Doubling the pre-injury wage increases the amount of the structured
settlement by 40.4 percent. These results reflect the fact that higher earners and married people
both have higher compensation rates since time loss payments depend on pre-injury wages as
well as on marital status and the number of dependents.
Higher medical costs are also associated with increased structured settlement amounts,
which could reflect the fact that claims with higher medical costs are likely more severe and
may be more likely to continue to incur high expenses in the future. Doubling medical costs is
associated with a 21.0 percent increase in the structured settlement amount. These results
highlight the importance of the expected costs of the claims in the settlement decision and
amount and suggest that L&I is willing to pay more to settle more costly claims, which is
consistent with one of the goals of structured settlements being to lower costs for the state fund.
The coefficients on the ability-to-work variables (assessed as able to work, eligible for a
vocational rehabilitation plan, having returned to work, and completing a retraining plan are all
negative and statistically significant. People who have returning to work as a potential outcome
are likely willing to take a lower settlement. The settlement amount that L&I is willing to pay
likely falls also for people who can return to work, because they will likely cost L&I less in
time loss benefits in the future.
Having a lawyer is associated with having a higher settlement amount. This relationship
could reflect that people who feel they are entitled to a higher settlement amount hire a lawyer,
that a lawyer is better at negotiating a structured settlement, or that workers will only accept
higher settlements since they will receive less because of their lawyers’ compensation. Given
the differing opinions from the focus groups about the importance of an attorney, it is
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interesting that having an attorney is associated with an increased structured settlement almost
exactly equal to the attorney fee for structured settlements of 15 percent.
Self-Insured Employers
As is true for all of our analyses, the focus groups provided very limited information
about self-insured employers. Only one employee from a self-insured company agreed to speak
with us. When asked why she thought we were having trouble recruiting injured workers from
self-insured employers she replied “because they are afraid.” She alleges that self-insured firms
do not receive enough oversight from L&I. It is interesting that she apparently felt this way
even though she had representation by an attorney whom she praised. She was more eager to
discuss her treatment prior to starting the structured settlement process than the process itself.
Four of the mail survey respondents who had received settlements indicated that they
had worked for a self-insured employer. Two of the four were obviously quite unhappy. They
both indicated that they were “Very Dissatisfied” with their structured settlement outcome and
the structured settlement process. One of them responded to an open-ended prompt that they
had “been forced to settle.” One of the other two respondents was apparently happy with his/her
settlement. He/she responded with a “Very Satisfied” to the item asking for how satisfied they
were with their settlement and with the settlement process. The fourth self-insured employer
respondent was in between these two extremes—neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the
settlement or the settlement process.
Life after the Structured Settlement
During our focus groups, a few individuals shared stories of moderate splurges with the
structured settlement money, but these were not common. Several people stated that they used
the structured settlement to help them catch up on bills that they had fallen behind on while
dealing with their injuries. Others said they were saving their structured settlement money for
retirement. While a few of the people we talked to had returned to work, most did not feel they
were physically able to work.
Most people were still receiving their structured settlements, which made assessing
financial stability after the settlements difficult. While some people expressed financial
concerns in general, the majority seemed to be thinking of ways to make their structured
settlement last and did not seem panicked about when the settlement payments would end. We
found the lack of panic to be reassuring since as part of looking at the best interest, both L&I
and the BIIA have conversations with unrepresented workers about their financial stability after
the settlement money ends. With that being said, one person in particular was worried about
what would happen after the money stopped coming.
The mail survey asked some questions about major expenditures, financial investments,
and levels of savings after receiving a settlement. Twenty-one of the 56 (38 percent)
individuals in the survey who had received a settlement reported that they had made large
medical expenditures since. Fifteen (27 percent) had purchased an automobile; 7 had made
home renovation expenditures; 6 had vacation expenses, and 5 had major appliance purchases.
In the financial realm, 6 of the 56 had invested in stocks, mutual funds, or bonds; about half
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reported that their savings today were greater than before the settlement (half reported that this
was not true).
Employment Outcomes
One of the focuses of the legislature in their mandate for this study is the extent of
employment after settlements. We use two of our sources of information to attempt to address
this issue. Unfortunately, both sets of data have shortcomings that constrain the analyses. The
“bottom line” of our analyses is that at least 10 percent of individuals who received a settlement
are employed, and most of the employment is on a part-time basis. From our survey of
applicants, we found that about 17 percent self-reported that they were employed. So it is likely
that 10 to 15 percent of CRSSA recipients are employed one year after receiving their
settlement.
As noted above, one of the response categories in the mail survey about individuals’
motivations for applying for a settlement was “wanted to work.” Approximately 20 percent of
the survey respondents who indicated that they had received settlements noted this reason as
one of their motivators. In other words, there was some sense that continued receipt of
indemnity benefits was getting in the way of productive employment on the part of some
claimants.
The mail survey provides self-reported information about post-settlement labor force
behavior. These data should be interpreted carefully because they are subject to the survey’s
response bias. For example, some individuals may not have responded to the survey because
they felt they were too busy or too tired after working. In any case, of the 56 individuals who
responded to the mail survey and indicated that they had received a settlement, 53 provided
information about their current labor force status. Two of the individuals were self-employed;
seven were working for an employer—all of them part-time; 10 individuals indicated that they
were not employed but were looking for work; and the remaining 34 individuals reported that
they were either planning to look for work in the future or not planning to work at all. The
employment rate for this sample of individuals is then 17 percent (9 out of 53). The
unemployment rate is 52.6 percent (10 looking for work divided by 19 either looking or
employed).
Table 8 provides frequency distributions about characteristics of this sample. The
individuals who reported working are preponderantly male, over 60, and with some college as
their highest level of education.
The second source of data about employment comes from the administrative data that
were accessed from the L&I data warehouse. Claims records were matched to unemployment
insurance wage record data by L&I staff persons. A very limited set of data were supplied to us.
In particular, we have five indicator variables that have been set if earnings added over the first
four quarters after a settlement are between $0 and $6,000; $6,000 to $12,000; $12,000 to
$24,000; $24,000 to $48,000; or over $48,000. If any of these indicator variables are set, then
we have a sixth indicator variable that equals 1 indicating that the individual was employed at
some time during the first four quarters after the quarter in which the individual reached a
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Table 8 Characteristics of the Mail Survey Sample of Individuals with a Settlement, by Employment
Status
Employed
Characteristic
(incl. self-employed)
Looking for work
Not in the Labor Force
Sex
Male
7
(77.8%)
5
(50.0%)
27
(79.4%)
Female
2
(22.2%)
5
(50.0%)
7
(20.6%)
Marital Status
Married, partner present
6
(66.7%)
6
(60.0%)
26
(81.3%)
Not married
3
(33.3%)
4
(40.0%)
6
(18.7%)
Age (current)
< 60
0
(0.0%)
3
(30.0%)
7
(20.6%)
60 – 65
4
(44.4%)
3
(30.0%)
17
(50.0%)
> 65
5
(55.6%)
4
(40.0%)
10
(29.4%)
Education
HS grad or less
2
(22.2%)
2
(20.0%)
8
(23.5%)
Some college (incl. assoc. degree)
7
(77.8%)
8
(80.0%)
21
(61.8%)
Bachelors +
0
(0.0%)
0
(0.0%)
5
(14.7%)
Spouse working?
4
(44.4%)
2
(20.0%)
14
(41.2%)
TOTAL
9
(100.0%)
10
(100.0%)
34
(100.0%)
NOTE: Table entries are counts and column percentages. Percentages do not included missing values.

settlement. Note that due to lags in data availability, L&I only had wage record availability
through the 3rd quarter of 2015. This implies that we only have a full four quarters of earnings if
the date of the settlement occurred prior to the 4th quarter of 2014. However, the indicator for
having some earnings, which we use as our measure of employment, will be set through the
second quarter of 2015.
After eliminating duplicate claims, our administrative data has 224 records of
individuals with state-fund workers’ compensation claims who received a settlement between
January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2015. Twenty of these records (8.9 percent) have nonzero
earnings over the four quarters following settlement. As was true with the mail survey data,
most of these were males (17 of the 20); and most of them were married (15 of the 20). The age
at settlement distribution of these employed individuals is fairly mixed: at settlement, 9 were
under 60; 8 were 60 to 64; and 3 were 65 or older.
Most of the individuals (12) have earnings levels in the lowest category: $0 to $6,000
suggesting that most of the employment is part-time. The number of individuals in the other
classes of earnings were 0, 2, 2, and 4 for the $6,000–$12,000; $12,000–$24,000; $24,000–
$48,000, respectively.
To learn about the individuals who were working part-time, we examined the 16 records
that had a settlement date prior to 2015. (The four records with settlements in 2015 that have
earnings information are all in the $0 to $6,000 class, but it is not possible from these data to
know if this is because of part-time employment or simply the truncation of wage record data to
the 3rd quarter of 2015.) Half of these records have earnings between $0 and $6,000, and half
have earnings over $12,000. For purposes of this report, we will use the former as an indicator
of part-time employment, and the latter as full-time.
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Table 9 shows the distributions of the 16 cases for a number of characteristics.
Interestingly, none of the part-time earners are over 65, and the size of the settlement seems to
be inversely related to working part-time. But of course, the number of observations is
extremely small, so one cannot generalize from these distributions.
Table 9 Characteristics of Part-time and Full-time Workers from Administrative Data
Part-time
Full-time
Characteristic
($0 < Earnings < $6,000)
(Earnings > $12,000)
Total
Sex
Male
7
(87.5%)
8
(100.0%)
15
(93.8%)
Female
1
(12.5%)
0
(0.0%)
1
(6.3%)
Marital Status
Married
5
(62.5%)
7
(87.5%)
12
(75.0%)
Not married
3
(37.5%)
1
(12.5%)
4
(25.0%)
Age at settlement
< 60
4
(50.0%)
4
(50.0%)
8
(50.0%)
60 – 65
4
(50.0%)
3
(37.5%)
7
(43.8%)
> 65
0
(0.0%)
1
(12.5%)
1
(6.3%)
Size of settlement
< $50,000
1
(12.5%)
0
(0.0%)
1
(6.3%)
$50 -- $100,000
5
(62.5%)
1
(12.5%)
6
(37.5%)
$100 - $150,000
1
(12.5%)
2
(25.0%)
3
(18.8%)
> $150,000
1
(12.5%)
5
(62.5%)
6
(37.5%)
TOTAL
8
(100.0%)
8
(100.0%)
16
(100.0%)
NOTE: Table entries are counts and column percentages.
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Employers’ Perspectives
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 10 employers during our field work in
Washington. Staff members from the Structured Settlement Unit were asked to contact
employers who had experienced structured settlements to set up the appointments. All
interviews were conducted over the phone between February 2 and February 5, 2016. As was
the case with individual claimants who had received structured settlements, State Fund
employers were much more likely than self-insured employers to agree to the interviews. Out of
10 employer representatives, one was a defense attorney who represented several employers,
and three were self-insured employers. These three very large employers represent
manufacturing, medical services, and a public entity. So there was considerable diversity among
our few self-insured sources. The two private sector self-insured employers had experienced
several structured settlements and the public entity had seen only one.
Our State Fund employers ranged from a small sheet metal firm to a large department of
State Government. While they ranged from less than 100 employees to several thousand in
employment, all but one of them had seen only 1 structured settlement at the time of our
interviews. One temporary staffing firm had no structured settlements and was glad to hear
about the program! Some of the employer contacts were familiar with settlement practices in
other states and brought that knowledge to bear on their comments about structured settlements
in Washington.
Employers generally felt that the structured settlement option in Washington was a very
good addition to the program. A few complained about a lack of advance information. Other
employers felt that this was a plus, because they did not have to be directly involved in
negotiating the deal. Obvious advantages to the employer include the permanent closure of the
claim for indemnity benefits, and the likelihood that there was a net savings in overall claim
costs.
Nearly all employers reported that workers’ compensation costs were a major burden,
ranking 9 or 10 on a 10-point scale. None of the employers had any contact with the worker
during the negotiation over the structured settlement, and contact after the settlement was very
rare. So employers had no idea whether their worker(s) with a structured settlement had
returned to work or not.
A good deal of frustration with the structured settlement process, mainly the BIIA
review, was reported by attorneys and self-insured employers. This was especially true before
the Zimmerman decision in 2014, which validated the role of the claimant’s attorney in
determining whether the settlement was “in the best interests of the employee.” There were
several stories offered about the early “pickiness” of the BIIA in reviewing draft structured
settlement agreements.
For self-insured employers, we asked how the structured settlement option related to
“side-bar agreements.” These are agreements between the employer and the employee that
develop while an appealed claim is being adjudicated at the BIIA. They develop out of the
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negotiation process and are strictly voluntary. Such agreements have no legal standing and
cannot be enforced like a contract. As a matter of policy, L&I does not enter into side-bar
agreements because they are not provided for under the law, which is why this is a practice of
self-insured employers only. The position of the self-insured employers we spoke with is that
there is no conflict between the side-bar agreement and structured settlement options. First,
because the side-bar is generally not used unless the claim has been appealed and is pending at
the BIIA, and second because the structured settlement is final and will be enforced, while the
side-bar agreement is not.
All employers felt that the age limitation was not needed, and just added an unnecessary
restriction to the availability of structured settlements. When asked for policy recommendations,
nearly all employer representatives recommended ending the age restriction. Several employers
also indicated that they preferred dealing with an attorney, rather than directly with the worker.
And they cited the lower level of attorney fees on structured settlements (at 15 percent) as
possibly limiting the financial appeal to claimant attorneys and reducing the availability of
structured settlements.
We received a number of suggested changes in policy and procedure with regard to
structured settlements from employers. As indicated earlier, several employers had the
perception that they should be involved sooner in the process, with a better flow of information.
One attorney pointed out that there is a problem of timing when a structured settlement
possibility arises during an appeal at the BIIA. A tentative agreement on the structured
settlement will stay the appeal, but if the BIIA determines that the agreement is not in the
workers’ best interest the appeal goes forward. This does not allow sufficient time for the
attorney to gather evidence and prepare for the presentation of the appeal. Another employer
representative pointed out that with the amount of information that a worker has to submit to the
BIIA to secure approval of a structured settlement, virtually all their cards are on the table and
their negotiating position could be seriously undermined.
Employers with Structured Settlements
This section will compare the distribution of State Fund employers with workers who
received structured settlements to the distribution of State Fund employers who had workers
that were eligible for settlements according to the requirements for eligibility (age of worker
and duration of claim), but who did not pursue such settlements. So the comparison is between
those employers with structured settlements (referred to as structured settlement employers) and
those with eligible workers who did not have structured settlements (referred to as eligible
employers) during the 2012–2015 period. This analysis will serve to indicate whether there is
broad access to the structured settlement program across the Washington economy, or whether
it has been confined to a narrow group of employers.
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Table 10 shows the distribution of employers by industry for the sample of structured
settlements and the broader eligible population.11 Workers at firms in construction, real estate,
and public administration appear to be more likely to secure structured settlements. While
workers in agriculture, retail trade, food and accommodation, and other services seem less likely
to receive such settlements. This may reflect the lower wage levels in these sectors. Despite
these differences, it seems clear that structured settlements have been widely distributed during
the first four years of the program since nearly all sectors of the economy are represented.
Table 10 Employer Industry Distribution
Eligible employers
2-digit industry
Number
Percentage
Agriculture
677
6.8
Mining
33
0.3
Utilities
49
0.5
Construction
1,539
15.5
Manufacturing
932
9.4
Wholesale trade
676
6.8
Retail trade
1,062
10.7
Trans & warehouse
690
6.9
Information
78
0.8
Finance & insurance
107
1.1
Real estate
375
3.8
Professional services
305
3.1
Management
4
0.0
Administration
575
5.8
Education
158
1.6
Health care
943
9.5
Arts & entertainment
139
1.4
Food & accommodation
671
6.8
Other services
621
6.2
Public administration
308
3.1
TOTAL
9,942
100.0

Structured settlement employers
Number
Percentage
4
1.9
0
0
0
0
50
24.3
20
9.7
13
6.3
17
8.3
16
7.8
2
1.0
1
0.5
13
6.3
4
1.9
1
0.5
11
5.3
4
1.9
20
9.7
1
0.5
6
2.9
10
4.8
13
6.3
206
100.0

Table 11 reports the distribution of structured settlements by the employment level of
the firms where those injured workers were employed. It is clear that there are more structured
settlements among larger firms. In fact, 11.5 percent of settlements involve employers of over
500 full-time equivalent employees whereas these employers make up only 2.9 percent of all
eligibles. The full impact is obvious in the fact that the mean employee level among employers
with settlements is 463 employees, while it is only 95 employees for all eligibles. But once
again, the distribution is well populated indicating that a wide swath of workers and their
employers have secured structured settlements to date.

11

The smaller number of observations reflects the fact that some employers had multiple CRSSAs.
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Table 11 Employer Size
FTE
Up to 10
10–25
25–50
50–100
100–500
> 500
TOTAL
Mean
Standard deviation

Eligible employers
Number
Percentage
2,507
30.2
1,542
18.6
1,310
15.8
1,203
14.5
1,490
18.0
239
2.9
8,291
100.0
95.4 ees
511.7

Structured settlement employers
Number
Percentage
42
26.8
19
12.1
16
10.2
21
13.4
41
26.1
18
11.5
157
100.0
463.3 ees
2,763.0

NOTE: FTE is defined as 1,920 hours. The reduced number of employers reflects missing data on this item.

This is also reflected in Table 12 which indicates the level of workers’ compensation
claims activity per quarter for Washington State Fund employers. Again, the proportion of
employers whose workers secured settlements is nearly twice as high for those with more than
10 claims. Interestingly, the proportion with zero claims per quarter is nearly identical for those
employers with and without structured settlements. This indicates that employers with
structured settlements are just as likely to have had a claim free quarter as other employers; but
they have a lot more employees. Comparing the two distributions at their respective mean
values shows that all eligible employers have about 17 employees per workers’ compensation
claim per quarter while employers with structured settlements have about 14 employees per
claim per quarter.
Table 12 Employer Claim Count
Eligible employers
Number of claims per
quarter
Number
Percentage
0
4,148
41.6
1–2
2,174
21.8
3–4
1,011
10.1
5–10
1,359
13.6
Over 10
1,279
12.8
TOTAL
9,971
100.0
Mean
5.6
Standard deviation
35.0

Structured settlement employers
Number
Percentage
89
43.2
25
12.1
10
4.8
34
16.5
48
23.3
206
100.0
32.6
224.0

The difference shows up clearly in Table13 also. Medical treatment costs for workers’
compensation claims are reported for all employers with eligible workers and for those with
structured settlements. Note that there is a great dearth of structured settlement employers with
total medical treatment costs below $25,000. Over 60 percent of employers with structured
settlements had aggregate medical costs over $50,000 for their workers’ compensation claims.
But once again, comparing the medical costs per claim shows that the average medical
treatment cost per claim for structured settlement employers is $6,034 while it is $6,529 for all
employers with eligible employees, nearly the same level.
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Table 13 Employer Medical Treatment Costs
Eligible employers
Medical treatment cost
Number
Percentage
< $2,500
1,202
12.0
$2,501–10,000
2,445
24.5
$10,001–25,000
2,387
23.9
$25,001–50,000
1,839
18.4
$50,001–100,000
1,359
13.6
$100,001–250,000
640
6.4
Over $250,000
99
1.0
TOTAL
9,971
100.0
Mean
$36,562
Standard deviation
100,191.1

Structured settlement employers
Number
Percentage
0
0.0
2
1.0
23
11.2
40
19.4
65
31.6
48
23.3
28
13.6
206
100.0
$196,698
550,387.5

Finally, the levels of the State Fund assessed employer quarterly premium for workers’
compensation coverage is compared in Table 14. The distribution of assessed premium reflects
the elements already explored. The assessed premium level is much higher for employers with
structured settlements due to their level of employment. In fact, 52.8 percent of structured
settlement employers pay premiums of over $100,000 per quarter, while 52.6 percent of eligible
employers pay premiums of less than $50,000 per quarter. The mean assessed premium level for
eligible employers is $135,890 per quarter, while it is $756,074 for employers with structured
settlements. But when standardizing for the level of full-time equivalent employment, structured
settlement employers pay $1,632 per worker and eligible employers without CRSSAs pay
$1,424 per worker.
Table 14 Employer Assessed Premium Levels12
Eligible employers
Quarterly premium
Number
Percentage
Up to $10,000
1,934
23.3
$10,000–25,000
1,290
15.6
$25,001–50,000
1,135
13.7
$50,001–100,000
1,284
15.5
$100,001–250,000
1,533
18.5
Over $250,000
1,115
13.4
TOTAL
8,291
100.0
Mean
$135,890
Standard deviation
422,853

Structured settlement employers
Number
Percentage
25
15.9
18
11.5
10
6.4
21
13.4
20
12.7
63
40.1
157
100.0
$756,074
2,196,621

Our conclusion is that there is no obvious bias in access to the structured settlement
program. Employees of larger employers are more likely to secure a structured settlement. But
workers for all kinds and all sizes of employers have been able to access the structured
settlement process in the first four years of its existence.
Impact of CRSSAs on State Accident Fund
The impact of structured settlements on the State Fund depends primarily on the
comparison between the amount of the settlements and the future benefits that would have been
paid without the settlements, less the cost of administering the system. Thus they will reflect the
bargaining over the amount of the structured settlement between L&I and the injured workers.
12

The reduced number of employers reflects missing data on this item.
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Assuming consistent administration by L&I, the injured workers’ time preference for money
will largely determine the potential State Fund savings from CRSSAs. If injured workers have a
marked preference for dollars today versus dollars in the future (discount rate), then the savings
from CRSSAs will be larger. If this is not the case, then savings from CRSSAs will be smaller.
Casual observation suggests that discount rates of workers are relatively high, certainly
much higher than current market interest rates. This is illustrated by the use of payday loans and
other high interest rate transactions. In previous research with the New York workers’
compensation system, Thomason and Burton estimated that the implicit discount rate for
workers accepting lump-sum settlements in New York was about 24-25 percent.13 That means
that the typical injured worker who accepted a lump-sum settlement was willing to accept $75
in a lump sum today in exchange for $100 received in periodic payments over the next year. So
there apparently is an opportunity for State Fund savings that actually increase the perceived
well-being of injured workers who accept CRSSAs, provided they have a high personal
discount rate. And the fact that application for such a settlement in the Washington system is
entirely voluntary would seem to insure such a result.
In addition to the discount rate of injured workers, the vocational rehabilitation option
also plays an important role in motivating structured settlements in Washington. In the worker
focus groups conducted for this evaluation, the desire to avoid the necessity to retrain for a new
career was an important reason for injured workers to pursue and/or accept a CRSSA. Very few
workers of age 55 years or more believed it made sense for them to return to school to learn a
new skill and embark on a second career. In the first place, they likely had significant
continuing physical limitations or they would not have been on workers’ compensation benefits
at all. And the distaste for “starting over” among the injured workers we spoke to was nearly
universal.
We investigated the possibility of using State Fund claim reserves as a way of estimating
the likely future claim costs that would have been incurred in the absence of the structured
settlement. However, we were told that the claim reserves were not kept up to date and would
not accurately serve the purpose we intended. We estimated the duration of claims for CRSSA
recipients using a statistical model based upon the characteristics of the individuals and their
claims.14 We used a matched sample technique to compare the durations of CRSSA claims with
other claims that applied or were eligible to apply but did not receive settlements. None of these
efforts resulted in significant insight into the future cost of claims at the time of the settlement.
This appears to reflect the fact that L&I is carefully screening these claims and selecting those
with greatest potential on the basis of characteristics that are not contained in the L&I data
warehouse. A great deal of additional personal information is collected by the Structured
Settlement Unit on the application for structured settlement, and these items were not available
to us because of confidentiality restrictions. Without a way of accurately estimating the cost to

13
Thomason, Terry and John F. Burton, Jr. 1993. “Economic Effects of Workers’ Compensation in the
United States: Private Insurance and the Administration of Compensation Claims,” Journal of Labor Economics
11(1): S1–S37.
14
This model was similar to those presented earlier on claimant characteristics but the outcome
(dependent) variable was duration of the claim in months.
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the State Fund of the alternative of “no CRSSA settlement” for these claims, we cannot
determine the actual financial impact of such settlements on the State Fund.
Employer Cost Impacts
In principle the impact of CRSSAs on self-insured employer costs would be similar to
that of the State Fund. The cost of the settlement is known and the discount rate of the insured
employer can be assumed to be relatively similar to that of the State Fund. The willingness of
the worker to accept a settlement should be similar except for the possibility that a self-insured
employer may be more aggressive in bargaining over the level of the CRSSA, which might
affect the likelihood of the worker accepting the offer. Unfortunately, L&I does not receive data
from self-insured employers in the data warehouse, so we were not able to access such data, nor
estimate the impact of CRSSAs on self-insured employer costs.15
The cost impact for State Fund insured employers is much more complicated because it
is determined not just by the level of the settlement and the cost of the alternative, but also by
the actuarial insurance pricing mechanisms that are used in Washington and other workers’
compensation systems.
Workers’ compensation insurance premiums are derived from estimates of the amount
of benefits that will be paid to claims arising in a given year. They are generally expressed in
dollars per hundred dollars of payroll. However, in Washington an hourly measure of labor
input is used, so premiums are expressed in dollars and cents per hour of employment.
All workers’ compensation programs develop rate class premiums for insurance
coverage based upon actual performance of firms in similar businesses, generally for about 300
rate classes. So, for example, all retail clothing stores will be grouped together to determine the
average cost of workers’ compensation benefits expected in a year. This figure will be added to
the cost of program administration to derive a premium rate in dollars and cents per hour. All
firms in the industry will use this base rate class premium as the starting point in figuring their
cost of workers’ compensation insurance coverage.
Normally, all costs of the workers’ compensation system are included in the rate class
premiums. In Washington this includes accident fund benefits, medical aid fund benefits, “Stay
at Work” benefits and “Supplemental Pension Fund” benefits. The administrative costs of the
system are also added to expected benefits to arrive at base rates by risk class.
Washington uses an experience rating system that modifies the rate class premium
according to the firm’s specific performance in the past. Based upon three years of actual
historical performance, each firm insured with the State Fund receives an experience
modification factor which expresses the relationship of their expected losses to the average for
the rate class group. These experience modification factors are simple ratios with the average
experience rating being .91. Firms that have performed better than average in the past will have
15

L&I collects the aggregate cost of claims from self-insured employers that do not differentiate between
medical costs and indemnity. Thus, it is not possible to discern the size of the structured settlements.
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experience modification factors less than 1.0 and firms that have performed worse than average
in the past will have experience modification factors greater than 1.0. When the firm’s
experience modification factor is multiplied by the base premium for their rate class, the actual
premium rate for workers’ compensation insurance coverage in dollars and cents per hour is the
result. When this is multiplied by the expected number of hours of work for a quarter or a year,
the estimated cost of insurance emerges.
There are a number of exceptions and refinements to the system that are designed to
prevent extreme variation in employer premiums from year to year. For instance, there is an
annual “swing limit” of 25 percent that is applied to experience modification factors. This will
prevent premiums from going up or down by more than 25 percent between years.16 There is
also a maximum claim value ($283,507 in 2016) that prevents a single catastrophic loss from
having too great an impact on an employer’s cost of insurance. There is also a credibility factor
that varies with the size of the firm. Larger firms have more predictability because of the larger
numbers of employees involved; so their credibility is higher and their experience receives
greater weight in the determination of experience modification factors. All these factors have
the effect of shifting the cost of the claim from individual firms to the rate group as a whole.
When viewed from the individual firm perspective, the experience modification factor is
the major influence on how their premium differs from other similar firms in the same line of
business. It is also the main way that State Fund employers might reduce their workers’
compensation costs. If they can improve their performance relative to the average in their
industry, workers’ compensation costs will go down with their experience modification factor.
Impact of Structured Settlements
How does a structured settlement impact employer premiums through this State Fund
experience rating system? It is obvious that a structured settlement will speed up the payment of
benefits over what would have happened in the absence of the settlement. But how is the
ultimate cost of benefits and future premium costs impacted? First, it is safe to assume that L&I
will offer a lower settlement amount than the expected cost of future benefits for the claim. The
goal of L&I is to reduce costs for the State Fund through CRSSAs. Assuming that the amount of
the structured settlement is less than the anticipated future benefit costs, the result will be a
reduction in premium for the employer. Let us turn to some illustrative examples.17
Suppose we look at a $20,000 CRSSA paid on a claim against a firm in the 0514 rate
class (garage door installation) with a relatively high base rate of $4.017 per hour, with a date of
injury that is within the 2016 experience period (2012-2014 date of injury), and that does not
involve any extenuating circumstances like multiple employers, second injury fund relief, or
third party recoveries. Assume that the claim has previously been paid $110,000 in benefits at
the time of settlement and anticipated future payments are $35,000. The effect of the $20,000
settlement is to reduce the overall claim cost from $145,000 to $130,000.
However, where the “computed before limitation” experience factor is below 1.0 and the employer has
an experience factor greater than 1.33 in the prior year, the factor is set to 1.00 which allows a change greater than
25 percent.
17
Thanks to L&I Actuary Joshua Ligosky for developing these illustrations for us.
16
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For a small firm in rate class 0514 with 10 full time equivalent (fte) employees (19,200
annual hours of employment) their experience modification factor would decline by 2.1 percent,
or about $.081 on the hourly premium rate. This would reduce their premium rate from $4.017
per hour to $3.936 per hour. For a larger firm with 50 ftes, the change in their experience
modification factor would be just $.030 per hour on the base premium, or less than 1 percent.
The larger firm receives less relief because a greater proportion of the loss is credible in the
actuarial model.
Larger settlements will have greater impacts, but the maximum claim cost and annual
swing limits may come into play because of the higher dollar amounts. For the same small firm
in class 5014 with a $100,000 CRSSA and anticipated future claim payments of $210,000, the
experience modification factor would decline by 9.0 percent, or $.341 per hour. The larger firm
would see a decline of 3.6 percent or $.136 per hour.
One more example, but with a $200,000 settlement, illustrates the impact of the
maximum claim cost ($283,507 in 2016) which reduces the amount the individual employer is
responsible for. Our small firm with a $200,000 settlement, would see their premium fall by 2.8
percent, or $.107 per hour. The larger firm would see a decline of just $.043 per hour, or 1.1
percent.
It is worth noting that the bulk of the losses in this case would be absorbed by the rate
class 0514 base, so all these employers could expect to see small increases in their rate class
base premiums in the future to absorb these excess losses. Nevertheless, it is clear that reaching
a structured settlement will benefit individual State Fund employers through small reductions in
their premiums, so long as the amount of the settlement is less than the anticipated future
benefit payments, not including medical aid because CRSSA recipients are still entitled to
medical benefits, for that claim.
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Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
This section of the report will summarize the major findings from our analyses, attempt
to tie those findings to conclusions about the quality and effectiveness of CRSSAs, and offer a
few recommendations for L&I and/or the legislature to consider.
Findings


During the first four years of their implementation, the number of CRSSAs that have
been approved has been modest. Our data indicate that State Fund settlements
number about 230 over that time period totaling about $22.5 million. On annual
basis, that is fewer than 60 settlements that average about $100,000 each; however,
the number of State Fund settlements has grown every year, including in 2015 by
66% over the prior year. This study has no data on the number or sizes of settlements
for claimants from self-insured employers.



The number of applications for CRSSAs, on the other hand, far exceed the number
of settlements. Our data indicate that over that same time period, about 1,225
applications for CRSSAs (about 5 times as many as approved settlements) from
injured workers were received by the Structured Settlement Unit of L&I. There were
925 individual claimants involved in these applications which were drawn from an
eligible population estimated at 19,500 injured workers who met the age and
duration qualifications. In other words, about 4.7 percent of those eligible apply for
CRSSA.18



The department is unable to settle with about 40 percent of applicants before
negotiation and 37% of the time after negotiations for various reasons, including the
following:
 Worker is not at or near maximum medical improvement so that levels of
permanent impairment or work restrictions can be estimated (31%)
 Application withdrawn or settlement rejected (by any party) (23%)
 Worker’s financial situation does not support settlement as being in their best
interest (18%)
 Worker able to work or returned to work prior to application (13%)
 Worker didn’t meet statutory criteria (6%)
 Other (9%)

18
The percentage of eligible claimants who apply for a settlement is relatively small because only about
thirty percent of the 19,500 “eligible” injured workers (5,236 to be exact) had been receiving time loss payments
for a substantial length of time (180 days or more). Of the 925 claimants who applied for a structured settlement,
89.9 percent had been receiving time loss payments for this length of time, and of the 230 settlements, all but three
had time loss payments for this length of time. The 925 claimants who applied represent 18% of the workers
receiving 180 or more days of time loss payments.
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CRSSAs seem to be “institutionalized” in the state. The SSU sends out letters
monthly to all newly eligible workers (who are also receiving time loss benefits)
advising them of the option to settle their claim. This may have been the only means
of notification when the CRSSAs began to be offered; however we learned that more
recently, referrals are being made by many sources. Injured workers are learning
about settlements from their claim managers, from health care providers, vocational
rehabilitation counselors, and from attorneys.



Applicants reported feeling well-informed about the process when they applied.
However, in response to our mail survey, half of the individuals who received a
settlement were uncertain about whether the medical expenses for their claims would
continue to be paid, and many of the individuals in the focus groups indicated that
they were motivated to settle because they felt that otherwise their benefits were at
risk. These facts suggest applicants may not have been as informed as they thought.



Training avoidance seemed to be a major motivating factor for applying for a
settlement. This was confirmed by the in person responses of individuals who had
settled in focus groups and by the mail survey responses.



The average and median time from L&I receiving an application to agreement is
about 6 months.



About one-fifth (18 percent) of applications were from claimants with
representation; however, applicants with representation were more likely to settle.
Forty-one percent of State Fund settlements were with claimants who were
represented. Coincidentally our model (Table 6) also indicated that being
represented increased the probability of securing a settlement given application by
18 percent.



Regression estimates of models of who applies for a settlement suggest that the
following characteristics about a claim are, other things equal, more highly
correlated with CRSSA application: male, high pre-injury wages, greater medical
expenses of the claim, assessed as able to work, eligible for a vocational
rehabilitation plan, having one or more IMEs, and having one or more protests. The
following characteristics are, other things equal, factors that indicate that the
claimant is less likely to apply: received PPD and claim reopened.



Regression estimates of models of who receives a settlement conditional on applying
suggest that the following characteristics about the claim are, other things equal,
more highly correlated with a settlement: higher medical expenses of the claim,
having the claim reopened, eligible for a vocational rehabilitation plan, and
representation by an attorney. The following characteristics are, other things equal,
factors that indicate that the applicant is less likely to receive a settlement: received
PPD benefits, assessed as able to work, having one or more IMEs, and having one or
more protests.



Approximately 10 to 15 percent of the individuals who received a settlement became
employed in the year afterward. Most of this labor force participation was on a parttime basis.
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Employers generally felt that CRSSAs were a good option, although they would like
to reduce or remove the age eligibility, and would prefer to be involved earlier in the
process of settlement.



In looking at distributions of employers whose injured workers have settled by
industrial sector, employment size, and workers’ compensation claim and premium
experience, it is clear that employers from throughout these distributions are
represented. However, larger employers with more claim experience, and in
particular, higher medical treatment costs per claim, are disproportionately
represented.



Reaching a structured settlement benefits individual State Fund employers through
small reductions in their premiums so long as the settlement amount is less than
anticipated future payments for that claim. It benefits the State Fund as a whole to
the extent that settlements are less than future claim costs plus administrative
expenses.

Conclusions
Our proposal offered several criteria to assess the quality and the effectiveness of
CRSSAs. These are listed in the first section of this document. When queried about the
applicability and thoroughness of these criteria, L&I administrators did not offer any
suggestions for additions, deletions, or changes. We were furthermore told that there are no
legislative background documents that might shed light on the legislative meanings of quality
and effectiveness. Consequently, we rely on these previously listed criteria here.
Quality Indicators


Results in positive outcomes for claimants
In our focus groups, we noted that many of the individuals who had received
settlements were quite satisfied with the amounts of the settlements. Respondents to
the mail survey seemed slightly less positive, but we think it is fair to say that, for
the most part, individuals who received State Fund settlements were satisfied. We
had a very small number of interactions with self-insured claimants who settled, but
among the four interactions, three were very unhappy about their settlements and the
process.
In terms of outcomes, the mail survey respondents reported using the proceeds from
their settlements for a number of major expenditures that they felt were needed. All
of the data sources that we used showed a low rate of employment after settlement,
and usually part-time.



Perceived to be fair/equitable by claimants and employers – horizontally and
vertically
Horizontal equity would be treating equally all claimants or employers who had
similar circumstances. Vertical equity would be providing larger settlements to
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individuals who have more need or more dire circumstances. We were not able to
explicitly test this criterion, but we did not receive any comments or evidence of
either horizontal or vertical inequity.


Unbiased (non-skewed) participation behavior
Our regression and cross tabular analyses showed a number of characteristics in
which applicants differed from the general eligible population of claimants,
individuals who settled differed from the applicant pool, the size of the settlement
differed systematically, and employers with certain characteristics were
disproportionately represented. However, we have no evidence that any systematic
bias was introduced explicitly, and furthermore, the relatively small sample sizes of
our analyses populations will naturally stray from randomness.



Positive outcomes for employers
Analyses suggest that employers with injured workers who receive a settlement are
likely to experience slight reductions in premium. Only a very small proportion of
individuals with a settlement enter the labor force, so there is virtually no benefit in
the way of an expanded available work force.



Minimal unintended consequences
We uncovered no unintended consequences.

Effectiveness Indicators


Outreach information is accurate and disseminated widely to potential applicants
In the early months of implementation of CRSSAs, L&I aggressively disseminated
information to potentially eligible claimants. The initiative is now fairly well
understood and information about it is widely disseminated.



Processing is timely
Although processing seems to have gotten faster over time, the mean and median
time between application and agreement were both about 6 months suggesting that
there were few outliers. We do not have an opinion about whether 6 months should
be considered timely. There are arguments both ways.



Reasonable administrative cost per claim
We did not collect administrative cost data.



Wide employer awareness and perception that program reflects employer input
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While we did not cast a wide net, it seemed as though there was considerable
familiarity with the program among employers. We did receive some comments
suggesting that employers would like information earlier in the process than when
their signature is required on the contract.


Benefits accrued exceed the costs of the program
The monetary benefits of the program would be reductions in total indemnity
payments for claims. These reductions would be projected indemnity and
rehabilitation payments minus the settlements. We were not able to project those
payments, but we do know that total settlements were on the order of $22.5 million.
We did not collect administrative cost data.

Recommendations
During the focus groups, we solicited suggestions about the structured settlement
process from each worker. Although none of the suggestions achieved a consensus, the items on
the following list seemed to resonate with several:


One person did not like that the structured settlement went to the lawyer, who was
then responsible for sending her a check. Instead, she thought it would be better if
L&I sent one check to her and one to the lawyer. Another person expressed that he
felt cut out of the process once he hired an attorney. He would have preferred for
L&I to communicate with both him and the lawyer.



One worker stated that he needed more time to make a decision but that L&I
required a decision immediately. He would have liked more time to decide about
taking the structured settlement after negotiations.



A few people mentioned that they had different claim managers throughout the
process. They felt continuity would have made the process easier for them.



Two people said L&I should make the process easier for people without computers,
especially given that this program is intended for older people.



Several people commented that going before a judge was intimidating and expressed
that they felt uncomfortable with all of the information they had to share. A related
complaint was that the administrative burden was high.



A few workers thought speaking with other people who had gone through the
structured settlement process would have been helpful. They suggested that L&I
could connect structured settlement recipients with people who were starting the
process.



Two workers mentioned that they would like L&I to clarify under what
circumstances medical claims can be reopened.

As noted earlier in this report, the employers that we engaged during the study had two
recommendations:
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Reduce or remove the age eligibility restriction



Involve employers earlier in the settlement process.

From our study team’s perspective, we have the following suggestions or questions
about program operations:


Might it be possible to improve the clarity and thoroughness of the information
about the CRSSA process that gets provided to individuals who are interested in
applying? Mail survey respondents had uncertainty about a very basic tenet of the
program—continuing medical costs associated with the claim would be covered, and
focus group participants expressed uncertainty about what benefits would be
available if they didn’t settle.



Is all of the information requested on the application necessary? The application is
quite burdensome, and it seems to us that if the information is carefully and
thoroughly explained to claimants, they should be able to determine what is in their
own best interest.

From our study team’s perspective, we have the following suggestions about future
studies of CRSSAs:


If the legislature requires information about self-insured employers and claimants,
then some mechanism for accessing appropriate data needs to be instituted.



Systematic analyses of why the largest share of applications is denied should be
undertaken.



Future studies should collect administrative cost data.



If post-settlement employment continues to be a topic of interest, then more
information from wage record data needs to be made available.



Continue and possibly expand the use of focus groups and employer interviews. In
addition to providing us with context and allowing us to hear the stories behind the
numbers, we believe the focus groups provided us with the following:
 testable hypotheses
 better understanding of attitudes and behavior
 corroboration of information gleaned from other sources of data
 information that we might not have known to ask about

In conclusion, we hope that these recommendations will be of use to the Department of
L&I and to the legislature as they continually attempt to improve the functioning of this
program option.
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